We give the first polynomial algorithm to compute a Walrasian equilibrium in an economy with indivisible goods and general valuations having only access to an aggregate demand oracle, i.e., an oracle that given a price vector, returns the aggregated demand over the entire population of buyers. Our algorithm queries the aggregate demand oracle O(n) times and takes O(n 3 ) time, where n is the number of items.
Introduction

A macroscopic view of the market
As part of our everyday experience, prices reach equilibria in a wide range of economics settings. Yet, markets are complicated and consist of heterogeneous goods and a huge population of buyers can have very diverse preferences that are hard to model analytically. With the sheer amount of information needed to describe the economy, how can the market possibly reach an equilibrium? Well, perhaps not all this information is needed.
In this paper, we provide evidence supporting this belief through the lens of algorithms. Specifically, we propose algorithms for computing market equilibrium using very limited amount of information. Our result suggests that information theoretically, it is not necessary to make too many measurements or observations of the market to compute an equilibrium. This may also shed light into how markets operate.
As the first step, we must design a realistic model to represent the economy. The standard TCS approach would require the entire input be specified but for a market, it is simply too computationally expensive to model its individual agents in full details. So what should we turn to? If equilibrium represents the collective behavior of the agents, perhaps some kind of aggregate information would do the magic. Such information can be average salaries, interest rate, population, fashion trend and so on. An algorithm would ideally process these macroscopic-scale information in an efficient manner to compute equilibrium price that allows the market to clear.
We show that it is possible to compute market equilibrium by exploiting the very rudimentary information of aggregate demand, i.e. the quantity demanded for each item at a given price aggregated over the entire population of buyers. This result implies, among other things, that a market can be viewed as an aggregate entity. For the sake of reaching equilibrium, detailed knowledge about its individual buyers at the microscopic level may not really be needed. Rather, it should be their collective behavior that dictates the outcome of the market.
The use of aggregate demand by our algorithm also resembles a common perception of the role played by excess demand/supply. A highly sought-after goods would usually see its price soar whereas an unpopular good would be inexpensive. This is similar to our algorithms which, in some sense, operate by increasing the price of overdemanded good and vice versa in an iterative fashion. We note however that by no means are we suggesting that our algorithms closely mirror how a market actually works. While the holy grail of this research direction is to understand how market reaches equilibrium in practice, perhaps a humble first step is to show that this can be done algorithmically with as little information and assumption as possible.
Our starting point is the Gul and Stachetti's model [GS99] of an economy of indivisible goods, but we make no further assumptions on the structure of the valuation functions. Our goal is to compute market equilibrium: a set of item prices and allocations of items to buyers such that the market clears and each buyer gets his favorite bundle of goods under the current prices.
The market can only be accessed via an aggregate demand oracle: given prices for each item, what is the demand for each item aggregated over the entire population. Clearly in this model, it is not possible to compute an allocation from items to buyers, since the oracle access model doesn't allow any sort of buyerspecific information. Curiously, equilibrium prices are still computable and in a very efficient manner:
Theorem (informal). In a consumer market with n goods and m buyers, we can find an equilibrium price, whenever it exists, using O(n) calls to the aggregate demand oracle and O(n 3 ) time.
Notably, the number of buyers plays no role. Our algorithm has query and time complexity essentially independent of the number of players. This feature is especially relevant in practice as markets are usually characterized by a large population and relatively few number of goods. The city of Berkeley, for example, has about 350 restaurants but 120,000+ people!
From telescopes to augmenting lenses
Aggregate demand oracles are like looking at the economy from a telescope. Having a telescope has its advantages: it is possible to get a very global view of the economy with a few queries. On the other hand, extracting details is hard.
Our second question is how fast equilibrium can be computed with only a local view of the economy? Our analogue for augmenting lenses will be the value oracle model, in which one can query the value of each buyer for each bundle. This again has its advantages: it provides very fine-grained information about the market, and has its shortcomings: it also takes many queries to extract any sort of global information.
Can equilibrium prices be computed with small amount of information even at the microscopic level? This quest is clearly hopeless for general valuation functions. But for one of the most important classes of valuation functions in economics, gross substitute valuations, there are enough structures to allow us to construct equilibrium prices using microscopic information.
The history of gross substitutes is intertwined with the development of theory of Walrasian equilibrium (also called market equilibrium in this paper). Indeed, Kelso and Crawford [KC82] show that Walrasian equilibrium always exists for gross substitute valuations. Hatfield and Milgrom [HM05] argue that most important examples of valuation functions arising in matching markets belong to the class of gross substitutes. Gross substitutes have been used to guarantee the convergence of salary adjustment processes in the job market [KC82] , to guarantee the existence of stable matchings in a variety of settings [Rot84, KTY14] , to show the stability of trading networks [HKN + 15], to design combinatorial auctions [AM02, MSY13] and even to analyze settings with complementarities [SY06, HK15] .
Since the oracle access is very local, we clearly need to query each agent at least once, so the dependence on the number of buyers needs to be at least linear. We show that indeed it is possible to solve this problem with a linear dependence on the number of buyers and cubic dependence in the number of items:
Theorem (informal). In a consumer market with n goods and m buyers whose valuation functions satisfy the gross substitute condition, we can find an equilibrium (or Walrasian) price and allocation using mn+ O(n 3 ) calls to the value oracle and O(n 3 ) time.
Also, since we have buyer-specific information, we can compute the optimal allocation at no additional time. We also show that improving the cubic dependence on n would imply subcubic algorithms for the Matroid Union and Matroid Intersection problems.
Proving this result requires novel insights about the structure of gross substitute valuations. In particular, one of our main structural lemmas answers a question posed by Hsu et 
Our algorithms and techniques
Our algorithms are based on convex programming. Modulo various details, we follow this plan: (i) Cast the Walrasian equilibrium problem as minimizing a convex function f . Here it is crucial that we use a compact formulation where the number of variables depends on the number of items but not on the number of players. (ii) Show how the subgradients of f can be computed efficiently. (iii) Apply cutting plane (or ellipsoid) methods [Kha80, Vai96, LSW15] to find an approximate minimizer of f . (iv) Round it to an exact minimizer.
This general approach poses different challenges in the two settings we study. In the first setting (general valuations, aggregate demand oracle), the main challenge is that we are trying to minimize f but we can't evaluate it -we only have access to subgradients. To overcome the first issue, we make use of a very recent development in cutting plane methods [LSW15] . In addition to having an improved running time, it also provides a "dual certificate" crucial for our purpose. When applied to minimizing convex functions, we prove that the dual certificate would reveal an approximate minimizer provided that the separation oracle used is a "subgradient" oracle (as in our case). This can be done without knowing the value of f (p). Another issue is with the rounding step (iv). Standard convex optimization models would render finding exact minimizers impossible. Luckily in our case, we can apply the perturbation technique used for solving LP exactly [Kha80] even though our function is not linear.
In the gross substitutes setting, one can use structural properties of gross substitutes to implement an aggregate demand oracle with O(mn 2 ) calls to a value oracle. This can be plugged into our result for general valuations to obtain a O(mn 3 ) algorithm for computing Walrasian prices. We are able to design a faster algorithm by modifying f appropriately. Our modification is reminiscent to the use of regularizers in convex optimization. The regularizer is carefully chosen so that it doesn't change the optimal solution and it makes subgradients faster to compute. This idea brings the running time down to O(mn 2 + n 3 ). A second improvement is to realize that one of the stages of the subgradient computation can be re-used in multiple iterations, amortizing its cost per iteration, which leads us toÕ(mn + n 3 ) running time.
The convex function f we optimize is defined over the space of prices, so its solution is a vector of Walrasian prices. Obtaining a Walrasian allocation is a non-trivial task. We discuss two methods for doing 1 
While Hsu et al [HMR
+ 15] raise the same question of how to deal with the fact that Walrasian prices can cause agents to be indifferent among various bundles, they pursue the question from a different perspective. They give conditions under which the minimal vector of Walrasian prices induces vanishingly small overdemand as the market grows large. Our results say nothing about the minimal Walrasian prices, but show the existence of prices for which no agent is indifferent between two bundles. In that sense, while morally motivated by the same question, the results are incomparable.
so: the first is by solving a Matroid Union problem. This requires an extra O(n 3 ) computation to obtain an allocation from prices. The second solution is to reconstruct a Walrasian allocation from the subgradients used by the cutting plane method. To prove this result, we show that if the Walrasian allocation is unique, the set of Walrasian prices must be a full-dimensional polytope containing a box of sidelength 1/n (assuming the valuations take integral values). This allows us to argue that in this case, the cutting plane algorithm will eventually query a point in the interior of the set of Walrasian prices.
Comparison to related work
The first algorithm for computing Walrasian equilibria in an economy of indivisible goods is due to Kelso and Crawford [KC82] and it is inspired by Walras tâtonnement procedure [Wal74] , which means "trial-anderror". Despite the name, it constitutes a very ingenious greedy algorithm: goods start with any price, then we compute the aggregate demand of the agents, increase the price by one for all goods that were overdemanded and decrease by one the price of all goods that are under-demanded. This gives a very natural and simple algorithm in the aggregate demand oracle model. This algorithm, however, is not polynomial time since it runs in time proportional to the magnitude of the valuations.
The Welfare Problem for gross substitutes was independently shown to be solvable in polynomial by Murota [Mur96c] and Nisan and Segal [NS06] . Remarkably, this was done using completely different methods.
Nisan's and Segal's approach is based on a linear programming formulation of Walrasian equilibrium due to Bikhchandani and Mamer [BM97] . The authors show that the dual of this formulation can be solved using both the value and demand oracles for gross substitutes as a separation oracle for the LP. This can be combined with the fact that demand oracles for gross substitutes can be constructed from value oracles in O(n 2 ) time [DT95] to obtain a polynomial-time algorithm in value oracle model. This is the method that is closer to ours in spirit: since we both approach the problem via a mathematical programming formulation. In terms of oracle access, Nisan and Segal crucially rely on value oracles to implement the separation oracle in their LP -so their solution wouldn't generalize to the aggregate demand oracle model, since neither per-agent demand oracles nor value oracles can be recovered from aggregate demand oracle 2 The running time in their paper is never formally analyzed, but since their formulation has m + n variables, it would lead to a superlinear dependence in the number of agents.
Nisan and Segal employ the LP to compute a set of Walrasian prices and the value of the Walrasian allocation. In order to compute the allocation itself, they employ a clever technique called self-reducibility, commonly used in complexity theory. While it allows for an elegant argument, it is a very inefficient technique, since it requires solving nm linear programs. In total, this would lead to a running time of O(mn(m + n) 3 ) using currently fastest cutting plane algorithms as the LP solver.
A second technique was developed by Murota [Mur96b, Mur96c] and leads to very efficient combinatorial algorithms. Murota's original paper never mentions the term "gross subsitutes". They were developed having a different object in mind, called valuated matroids, introduced by Dress and Wenzel [DW92, DW90] as a generalization of the Grassmann-Plücker relations in p-adic analysis. Murota developed a stronglypolynomial time algorithm based on network flows for a problem called the valuated matroids assignment problem. There is a tortuous path connecting gross substitutes to valuated matroids. Valuated matroid turned out to be one aspect of a larger theory, Discrete Convex Analysis, developed by Murota (see his book [Mur03] for a compreshensive discussion). One central object of this theory is the concept of M ♮ -concave functions, introduced by Murota and Shioura [MS99] . It came to many as a surprise when Fujishige and Yang [FY03] showed that M ♮ -concave functions and gross substitutes are the same thing. Their equivalence is highly non-trivial and their definitions are very different to the point it took at least a decade for those concepts to be connected.
Murota's algorithm for the valuated matroids assignment problem can be mapped to an algorithm for computing Walrasian equilibria for gross substitutes. Doing this requires two ingredients: (i) using the one-to-one relation between gross substitutes and valuated matroids to convert the valuation functions to their counterparts in the valuated matroid worlds; (ii) specializing the assignment problem to the Walrasian equiilibrium problem. In Section 5 we show how this can be done. Applying Murota's algorithm in a straightforward manner to the gross substitutes welfare problem and analyzing its running time 3 , one can obtain a O(mn 3 log(m + n)) time algorithm.
Motivated by our improved running time of O(mn + n 3 ) obtained using cutting-plane methods, we revisited Murota's algorithm and optimized it for the case of gross subsitute valuations. Here are our two contributions: (i) Murota's algorithm works by computing augmenting paths in a graph called exchange graph. Our first contribution is to show that for the Walrasian equilibrium problem, the exchange graph admits a more succinct representation. (ii) It is possible to keep a data structure that will allow us to re-use from one iteration to the next. Remarkably, the techniques used are similar to the ones used to speed up the subgradient computation in cutting plane methods. Combined they yield a strongly-polynomial time algorithm with running time O((mn + n 3 ) log(m + n))
Conclusion and Discussion
We provide in this paper the first polynomial-time algorithm for computing Walrasian prices with an aggregate demand oracle. Previous algorithms for this problem required either a value oracle or a per-buyer demand oracle, or both. We also gave the fastest (to the best of our knowledge) algorithm for computing a Walrasian equilibrium in economies with gross substitute valuations. En route, we showed necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of robust Walrasian prices and provided an algorithm to compute them. Why should we care about running time? The Walrasian equilibrium problem for gross substitutes was known to be solvable in polynomial time before this paper. So why is improving its running time important? We think the main reason is that it leads to new algorithmic ideas and new structural insights. For example, the question of the existence of robust Walrasian prices (Theorem 4.16) arised as a step towards computing the Walrasian allocation from subgradients. Later we noticed this structural lemma also provided answer to a purely economic question of independent interest. A second example is that by seeking to improve the running time, we looked for algorithms that would perform very simple operations and this made us stumble upon algorithms that used only the aggregate demand oracle. Why convex optimization? Since we provided a strongly-polynomial time algorithm of the same running time, why do we still need cutting-plane algorithms. Their main difference is that the combinatorial algorithm is primal: it maintains an initial allocation and iteratively updates it to improve via path augmentations. The cutting-plane algorithm acts purely on the space of prices. Both algorithms have interesting economic intuitions: while the combinatorial algorithm resembles an auction, the cutting-plane algorithm has a flavor more similar to the market dynamics envisioned by Walras. Also, the running time obtained from the cutting-plane algorithm is what motivated us to, in first place, try to optimize Murota's algorithm. Why not only gross substitutes? One of the salient features of our first result is that we compute Walrasia prices whenever they exist for any class of valuations. The reader might ask why this is interesting since Gul and Stachetti [GS99] show that gross substitutes are the largest class of valuations for which Walrasian equilibria exist. The confusion stems from the qualification in their result. Given a price vector p ∈ R n , we define the utility of agent i for a bundle
where p · x refers to the standard dot product n j=1 p i x i . Notice also that we make no assumptions about the signs of v i and p.
An allocation x = (x (1) , x (2) , . . . , x (m) ) is simply an assignment of items to each player where i receives
]. An allocation x is valid if it forms a partition of the items, i.e. i x
The social welfare of a valid allocation x is defined as SW(x) = i∈[m] v i (x (i) ). Finally, the optimal social welfare is simply the largest possible social welfare among all valid allocations.
In the following, we show the importance of prices in welfare economics, namely that if the market clears, then we achieve the optimal social welfare.
Given prices p ∈ R n , we would expect a rational agent to buy x such that his utility v i (x) − p · x is maximized. We call x the demand of i under p, as defined formally below. Note that there may be multiple utility-maximizing subsets.
Definition 2.1 (Demand set). Given prices p ∈ R n on each item, the demand set D(v, p) for a valuation function v is the collection of subsets for which the utility is maximized:
If v is the valuation function v i of player i, we also use the shorthand D(i, p) as the demand set.
We are now ready to define competitive equilibrium.
Definition 2.2 (Equilibrium).
A Walrasian equilibrium (also called competitive equilibrium) consists of a price vector p ∈ R n and a valid allocation
We call p an equilibrium/Walrasian price and x an equilibrium/Walrasian allocation induced by p.
In other words, a competitive equilibrium describes a situation where items are sold in such a way that the total demand i x (i) j for each item precisely meets its supply s j , i.e. the market clears. The reason for the name competitive equilibrium is that its achieve the optimal social welfare. This is known as the first and second welfare theorems in economics and for completeness we provide a proof here. Lemma 2.3 (First and Second Welfare Theorems). Let x = (x (1) , x (2) , . . . , x (m) ) be an equilibrium allocation induced by an equilibrium prices p. Then x achieves the optimal social welfare.
Moreover, if p is any set of Walrasian prices and x is any optimal allocation, then the pair (p, x) form a Walrasian equilibrium.
Proof. Let y = (y (1) , y (2) , . . . , y (m) ) be a valid allocation that achieves the optimal social welfare. Then since
Summing up, we get
the crucial observation is that i p · x (i) = i p · y (i) = j p j s j . herefore the inequality above simplifies to
i.e. the social welfare of x is at least that of y. But since y gives the optimal social welfare, we must then have equality and x also achieves the optimum. For the second part, notice that since the last equation holds with equality, then the previous equations should also hold, therefore:
, which says that x i is also a favorite bundle of i under price vector p. Therefore, (x, p) form a Walrasian equilibrium.
This lemma nicely reduces social welfare maximization to finding competitive equilibrium whenever it exists. Note that the definition of social welfare has nothing to do with prices. In a way, this lemma shows that equilibrium prices act as a certificate which demonstrates the optimality of equilibrium allocation.
Oracles
To study market equilibrium computationally, we must clarify how the market is represented and how we can extract information about it. In this paper we consider three models that access the market in different scales:
Microscopic Scale: Value Oracle Model
In the value oracle model the algorithm has access to the value that each agent has for each bundle. This gives the algorithm very fine-grained information, but it requires potentially many calls for the algorithm to access any sort of macroscopic information about the market. For example, it is obvious that value oracles alone are not enough to find Walrasian equilibria for general valuation functions.
Definition 2.4 (Value oracle). The value oracle for player i ∈ [m] takes x ∈ [[s]] as input and outputs v i (x).
We denote by T V the time spent by the value oracle to answer a query.
Agent Scale: Demand Oracle Model
In the demand oracle model the algorithm presents a price vector p to an agent and obtains how many units are demanded at that price. At any given price, the agent could be indifferent between various bundles. The demand oracle can return any arbitrary bundle.
Definition 2.5 (Demand oracle). The demand oracle for valuation agent i takes as input a price vector p ∈ R n and outputs a demand vector
We denote by T D the time spent by the demand oracle to answer a query.
Macroscopic (Market) Scale: Aggregate Demand Oracle Model
The aggregate demand oracle model presents a very macroscopic view of the market. In this model, the algorithm cannot observe individual agents but only the aggregate response of the market to any given price p. For example, a manufacturer deploying a product in the market is unable to observe each buyer's behavior, but only how many units were sold.
Definition 2.6 (Aggregate Demand oracle). The aggregate demand oracle takes as input a price vector p ∈ R n and outputs a demand vector
We denote by T AD the time spent by the demand oracle to answer a query.
Convex analysis
As we tackle the problem of finding market equilibrium using convex minimization, we need a few basic facts about subgradients [Roc15] . For differentiable functions, subgradients are just gradients. Throughout this section all functions are continuous, convex, real-valued, and defined over a convex subset of R n .
Definition 2.7. Let f be a convex function on
R n . g is a subgradient of f at p ′ if for any other p (in the domain), f (p) − f (p ′ ) ≥ g · (p − p ′ ).
The set of subgradients at p is denoted by ∂f (p). Sometimes we abuse notation by denoting a subgradient simply as ∂f (p).
It is well-known that every continuous convex function has a subgradient everywhere. Subgradients are nice particularly because they provide a "separation oracle" in the following sense. Note that this is almost a tautology.
By using g · (p ′ − p) ≤ 0 as a separating hyperplane, this is the basis on which subgradients allow us to solve convex minimization via the ellipsoid or cutting plane method in polynomial time.
We can identify a minimizer by looking at its subgradients.
Lemma 2.9. For convex f , p minimizes f iff 0 is a subgradient at p.
Finally, we will frequently take the subgradient of a function in the form h(p) = max i∈I h i (p).
Theorem 2.10. Let h(p) = max i∈I h i (p) where I is an index set and h i (p)'s are all convex. Then h is convex and ∂h(p) is the convex hull of the subgradient ∂h i (p) f or i ∈ arg max i∈I h i (p). In particular, any subgradient of h i (p) is a subgradient of h(p) whenever i ∈ arg max i∈I h i (p).
Walrasian equilibrium inÕ(n
We show that in the aggregate demand oracle model, whenever a Walrasian equilibrium exists, it can be computed usingÕ(n) aggregate demand oracles calls andÕ(n · T AD + n 3 ) time. We want to emphasize that our result is in the aggregate demand oracle model -which is the typical information available to markets: which goods are under and over-demanded by the population of buyers? Previous polynomialtime algorithms for computing Walrasian equilibria [BM97, NS06, Mur96c] require buyer-level demand oracles or value oracles. Previous algorithms that use only aggregate demand oracles (such as [KC82, GS99] and related methods based on ascending auctions) are pseudopolynomial since they depend linearly on the magnitude of the valuation functions. The result follows from formulating the Walrasian equilibrium problem as a convex minimization problem, which is then solved by applying (a recent development in) cutting plane methods [LSW15] and the random perturbation technique [Kha80] . The first allows us to compute an approximate minimizer without value oracles while the latter rounds an approximate minimizer to an exact one.
Our formulation involves optimizing over the space of price vectors. The Walrasian equilibrium problem has been formulated as a Linear Program by Bikhchandani and Mamer [BM97] and Nisan and Segal [NS06] . Our program can be seen as the dual of their formulation where the constraints have been moved to the objective in the form of penalties. This formulation has been also explored before [Aus06, MSY13] , where it is called the Lyapunov function of the market.
Given a market with supply s and agents with valuations v 1 , . . . , v m , we define the market potential function f : R n → R as:
Lemma 3.1. The market potential function f is convex.
Proof. This simply follows from the standard fact that the maximum of a family of linear functions is convex, since for any fixed
For the sake of completeness, we provide a self-contained proof here.
Given prices p, p ′ , consider any convex combination tp Proof. This follows by inspecting the subgradient of f . For the sake of completeness, we again provide a self-contained proof here.
Recall market clearing says that s = i x (i) and therefore
For any price p, we then have
This shows that p eq minimizes f . Furthermore, if p is also a minimizer of f , we must then have equality throughout and in particular,
In other words x is also an equilibrium allocation induced by p. Thus every minimizer of f is also an equilibrium price. Note that we have crucially relied on the existence of (p eq , x) here.
In light of the previous two lemmas, we can simply find an equilibrium price by minimizing f . This can be accomplished by the ellipsoid or cutting plane method 4 which requires a separation oracle. For the case of f , the separation oracle can be easily computed from the aggregate demand oracle. In fact, readers familiar with convex analysis would recognize that this is the subgradient of f . Proof. This follows by inspecting the subgradient of f . Again we include a proof here. Let x = (x (1) , x (2) , . . . , x (m) ) be the allocation used by the demand oracle for d(p). Then we have
Lemma 3.3 (Separation/subgradient oracle). Let d(p) be an aggregate demand oracle. Then given a price vectorp, the following inequality holds for all prices
where we have used the fact that
Lemma 3.3 has a very nice economic interpretation: the subgradient of f is given by the difference between the supply s and the aggregate demand of all agents d(p). So, for any given item, the subgradient is zero if supply equals demand, positive if the supply is under-demanded and negative if supply is overdemanded. Starting with an arbitrary allocation and following the opposite of this gradient is the core of many of many auction procedures for the welfare problem [KC82, GS99, MSY13, AM02].
Now we have almost all the ingredients to apply the cutting plane method to f . We use a recent improved cutting plane method [LSW15] . Since we do not need the full generality of their result, the theorem below is specialized to convex minimization with subgradient oracles. Not only is this a simplified version of their result, the use of subgradient oracles also allows us to establish a slightly stronger guarantee than Theorem 42 in [LSW15] . To avoid deviating from our treatment of market equilibrium, the proof of Theorem 3.4 is given in the appendix. 
However, the cutting plane method (in convex optimization in general) typically gives only an approximately optimal solution. This is unfortunately inevitable as an exact optimum is impossible to find for general convex functions if one has only the subgradient oracle. For example, even though the function g(z) = |z| has subgradient 0 at the minimizer z = 0, the subgradient oracle may mischievously report another subgradient, e.g. 1 so we would not even know even if we are at the optimum! Fortunately, in our case f is nice enough that an exact minimizer can be found in polynomial time. This is shown by writing f as an equivalent LP so that Khachiyan's perturbation method for LP (or its variants [GLS81] ) would apply.
We now show that Walrasian prices can be computed in polynomial time with the aggregate demand oracle. Note that it is impossible to find a Walrasian allocation in this setting because we have no access to valuation functions v i . Proof. First of all, we exhibit some minimizer (in other words, Walrasian price) in [−2M, 2M ] n . Let p eq be a vector of equilibrium prices. For any item j, there is some
Theorem 3.5. Suppose a market equilibrium exists. Then we can find an (exact) equilibrium price in
where 1 j is the unit vector in the j-th coordinate. This gives us:
For the upper bound, if there is only one buyer, then clearly p ′ j = −M ∀j makes him desire all the items and thus is a Walrasian price. If there is more than one buyer then p eq j must be larger than −2M , otherwise all the supply of item j will be demanded by all buyers. Now by Lemmas 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and Theorem 3.4, we can find a pricep such that
Now we explain howp can be rounded to an exact minimizer. We first consider how an approximate solution is rounded to an optimal solution for the following LP (which is essentially equivalent to our f ):
The great insights of Khachiyan are that (i) LP always has a BFS optimum and BFS's have polynomial bit complexity (Cramer's rule); (ii) we can guarantee uniqueness of optimum by perturbing the objective function. Here (ii) is important because if, say there are two optima, our approximate solution could be close to any of their convex combination and we would not know how to round it. Once we have (ii), one can show that any approximate solution must be close to the unique optimum and so rounding becomes easy.
Symbolically, we first perturb the coefficients "appropriately":
where w and r i are random numbers "close" to 1. An ǫ-approximate solution to this LP can then be rounded to an exact solution if 1/ǫ is polynomial in O(mnM S). Now back to out function f , this perturbing-rounding trick can also be applied. First we have to perturb f . It is easy to see everything (subgradient, convexity, etc.) would be okay. The cutting plane method would still give an approximate minimizer, which can then be rounded to an exact minimizer in the same way as Khachiyan's.
Finally, the running time follows by plugging into the guarantee in Theorem 3.4 1/ǫ is polynomial in O(mnM S) and ||∂f (p (t) )|| 2 = ||s − d(p)|| 2 ≤ nS + mnS.
Readers may wonder if we could have used this LP in place of f . The answer is no because we don't know the value of u which requires access to some value oracle.
Walrasian Equilibrium for Gross Substitutes inÕ((mn
In the previous session we discussed how Walrasian equilibria can be computed for general valuation functions under the aggregate demand oracle model. In this section, we restrict our attention to the class of gross substitute valuations, for which a Walrasian equilibrium is known to always exist, as originally showed by Kelso and Crawford [KC82] . Gul The concept of gross substitutes has been re-discovered in different areas from different perspectives: Dress and Wenzel [DW92] propose the concept of valuated matroids as a generalization to the GrassmannPlücker relations in p-adic analysis. Dress and Terhalle [DT95] define the concept of matroidal maps which are the exact class of functions that can be optimized by greedy algorithms. Murota [Mur96a] generalized the concept of convex functions to discrete lattices, which gave birth to the theory known as Discrete Convex Analysis. One of the central objects in the Discrete Convex Analysis are M -concave and M ♮ -concave functions (the later class was introduced by Murota and Shioura [MS99] ).
Surprisingly, gross substitutes, valuated matroids, matroidal maps and M ♮ -concave functions are all equivalent definitions -despite being originated from very different motivations. We refer to [PL] for a detailed historic description and a survey on their equivalence.
Our focus in this section will be gross substitute valuations. Since we are now working with concrete valuation functions, we will assume access to the value oracle instead of the demand oracle. Our goal is to specialize our treatment for general valuation to GS.
Unlike the previous section, we will be able to obtain both equilibrium price and allocation in this setting. By invoking our last result and a structural property of market equilibrium, we first provide an algorithm for finding market equilibrium with running time
More interestingly, we then "regularize" our objective f in a suitable way to obtain a faster algorithm which runs in time
Our regularization is based on insights from both convex optimization and the combinatorial structure of gross substitute valuations. It allows us to implement a demand oracle in a very efficient manner.
How does that compare with existing algorithms for the gross substitutes welfare problem ? Nisan and Segal [NS06] show that the problem is computable in polynomial time but don't explicitly analyze the running time. Murota [Mur96c] gives a strongly-polynomial time algorithm for the valuated matroid intersection problem. Since there is a one-to-one correspondence between valuated matroids and gross substitutes and it is possible to cast the welfare problem for gross substitutes as an intersection problem in valuated matroids (we provide such reductions in the Section 5), it is possible to obtain a strongly polynomial time algorithm for the welfare problem. While Murota doesn't explicitly analyze its running time, it is not hard to see that applying his algorithm for the welfare problem for gross substitutes gives a strongly polynomial timeÕ(mn 3 · T V ) algorithm.
The algorithm we discuss in this section has running timeÕ((mn + n 3 ) · T V ) which improves over a straightforward implementation of Murota's algorithm. After we obtained this result, we revisited Murota's algorithm and showed that it can be optimized (for the case of the gross substitutes welfare problem) to achieve a strongly-polynomial time algorithm with running timeÕ(mn + n 3 ).
The algorithm we obtain in this section is very different from Murota's algorithm. Most notably, our algorithm is based on prices and aligns better with economic intuition and interpretation, which is the subject of primary concern in this paper. While Murota's algorithm feels like a descending auction, our algorithm feels more like an accelerated tatonnement process.
Before presenting our algorithms, we first give a quick summary of the standard facts about gross substitutes that are needed. For a more comprehensive introduction, please see [PL] .
A crash course on gross substitutes
First of all, we need a change of notations. Gross substitutes are functions defined on a ground set rather than multiset. Thus in this section we have supply s j = 1 for all item j and our valuation function v i : 2 [n] → Z has ground set [n]. Each buyer i would choose a subset S which solves max
where p(S) = j∈S p j . So the demand set
Economically, the multiset setting can be reduced to the single-unit supply setting by treating each unit of items as a distinct entity. There has been some recent effort dedicated to extending gross substitutes to the multi-unit setting [ST15] . We will draw on the tools developed there in the next section to give similar results on market equilibrium computation in the multi-unit gross substitute setting. 
In other words, a price increases for some items can't affect the purchasing decisions for the items for which the price stayed the same.
An extremely powerful property of GS is that the utility maximization problem max v(S) − p(S) can be solved efficiently by the greedy algorithm. Notice how different this is from Definition 4.1. 
This definition highlights two other important properties of gross substitute valuations: (i) the demand oracle has a succint certificate of optimality and (ii) the function can be optimized via local search for any given prices.
Those definitions arised independently in different communities and, amazingly enough, those definittions turned out to be equivalent. We note that there are a few more starkly different definitions which are also equivalent to GS but are not needed for our purpose. Indeed, these unexpected equivalences demonstrate that GS is an unusually richly structured class of discrete functions that should perhaps deserve more attention.
Gross subtitutes is particularly important in economics because it guarantees the existence of equilibrium. In fact, in some sense it is the "largest" class of valuation functions that have this nice guarantee.
Theorem 4.4. If the valuation function v i of every buyer is gross substitutes, then a market equilibrium with integral equilibrium price exists.
One of the most useful (and largely unknown) fact about gross substitutes is the following analogue to the Unique Matching Theorem for matroids. The version of this theorem for gross substitutes due to Murota [Mur96b, Mur96c] and it was originally proved in the context of valuated matroids, which are known to be equivalent to gross substitutes under a certain transformation. We refer the reader to Lemma 10.1 in [PL] for a proof of this lemma in the language of gross substitute valuations: b 1 ), (a 2 , b 2 ) , . . . , (a k , b k )} is the unique minimum matching in G, then:
Lastly, we state a purely combinatorial lemma that is commonly used in conjunction with the previous lemma. We present a sketch of the proof here and refer to [PL] for a complete proof. Lemma 4.6. Let G = (V, E, w) be a weighted directed graph without negative weight cycles. Let C be the cycle of minimum number of edges among the cycles with minimum weight. Let M := {(u 1 , v 1 ), . . . , (u t , v t )} be a set of non-consecutive edges in this cycle, U = {u 1 , . . . , u t } and V = {v 1 , . . . , v t }. Construct a bipartite graph G ′ with left set U , right set V and for each edge from u ∈ U to v ∈ V in the original graph, add an edge of the same weight to G ′ . Under those conditions, M forms an unique minimum matching in G ′ . The same result holds for a path P of minimum length among all the minimum weight paths between a pair of fixed nodes.
Proof sketch. Assume that the bipartite graph has a different matching with total weight smaller of equal then the one presented. Then it is possible to construct either a cycle of weight less than C or a cycle of the same weight with smaller number of edges.
Let M ′ be an alternative matching between U and V of weight at most the weight of M . If the matching M ′ has smaller weight, replace M by M ′ and C ∪ M ′ − M is a collection of cycles with total weight smaller than the weight of C. Since all cycles have non-negative weight, one of the cycles must have weight less than C, contradicting the fact that C is a minimum weight cycle. Now, if M and M ′ have the same weight, consider the following family of cycles: for each edge e = (u ′ , v ′ ) in M ′ , construct a cycle C e composed of edge e and the path from v ′ to u ′ in C (in other words, we use e to shortcut C). There is an integer k ≤ t such that the collection of cycles C e uses in total: one of each edge from M ′ , k − 1 of each edge from M and k of each edge from C − M . So the average weight is at most the weight of C. Since the C e cycles strictly less edges than C, there should be a cycle with smaller edges than C and weight at most C, which again contradicts the choice of C.
The argument for paths is analogous.
Algorithms for finding equilibrium price
We present an algorithm for market equilibrium in the value oracle. Recall that a market equilibrium consists of both an equilibrium price p eq ∈ R n and a corresponding equilibrium allocation S = (S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S m ) induced by p eq (notice we have a change of notation in x as now v i are not defined on multiset anymore).
In this subsection, we first show that the value oracle easily implements the demand oracle. Hence the result from the last section already yields an efficient algorithm for computing an equilibrium price. However, obtaining a corresponding equilibrium allocation is not a trivial task. To do so we prove a lemma about the structure of the equilibrium prices (there can be more than one). This lemma would allow us to pick out some "maximal" equilibrium price from which a corresponding equilibrium allocation can be obtained easily.
Implementing demand oracles using value oracles
This is immediate from Definition 4.2. All we have to do is to run the greedy algorithm for each buyer. Proof. By Definition 4.2, the greedy algorithm outputs a correct solution S * . The number of queries is n · (|S * | + 1) as each iteration takes at most n queries to find the best element to add and there are precisely |S * | + 1 iterations.
Lemma 4.8. We can implement the demand oracle which answers each query in O(mn
Since there are m buyers, the total time is O(mn 2 T V ). The oracle simply outputs d(p) where d j (p) = #{i : j ∈ S * i }.
The O(mn 2 T V ) bound is essentially tight (for one demand oracle query) and provides the basis of our first algorithm. Plugging this into Theorem 3.5 gives us an algorithm in the value oracle model. In fact, in this case we can just use the LP in the proof of Theorem 3.5 straight away. Theorem 4.9. We can find an equilibrium price p e in O(mn 3 log(mnM ) · T V + n 3 log O(1) (mnM )) time for gross substitutes.
Proof. This follows from Theorem 3.5 and Lemma 4.8.
Faster Algorithm for finding equilibrium price via regularization
We present a regularization technique that would allow us to obtain a faster algorithm. Our algorithm works by reducing the amount of work needed to be done to compute a separation oracle for each iteration. More precisely, we show how the per-iteration cost of O(mn 2 T V ) (incurred upon querying value oracle) can be reduced to just O(n 2 T V ). As a corollary, we obtain an improved algorithm for equilibrium price with running time
Before getting into the specifics, we first give a motivating example. Consider the last iteration of the algorithm where we have an (almost) equilibrium price p eq and an equilibrium allocation S = (S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S m ). By Lemma 2.3, S is an equilibrium allocation for every equilibrium price and therefore
Suppose the greedy algorithm returns exactly S i for max S⊆[n] v i (S) − p eq (S) 6 . By Lemma 4.7, this involves n(|S i | + 1) oracle calls. Since S i 's form a valid allocation, |S i | = n and the total number of value oracle calls is just mn + n 2 for all the m buyers. This is significantly better than the bound O(mn 2 ) we had from before. Moreover, the cost of mn is incurred by querying v i ({j}) for all i, j. This information is needed regardless of what p is but the cost mn of acquiring it has to be paid only once.
In summary, this observation raises of question of whether a bound of mn + O(n 2 ·#iter) on the number of oracle calls can be achieved. In this subsection, we design a regularization technique that answers this in the affirmative.
New objective functionf
Our improved algorithm is accomplished by modifying our objective f as follows.
Note that
so we are simply imposing an additional constraint i |S i | = n. As we shall see, this change can be understood as a regularizer to reduce the number of oracle calls needed to compute the separation oracle.
As with the use of regularizers in other context in optimization, this is to penalize the algorithm for being too aggressive. The bound of O(mn 2 · T V ) is so costly precisely because our previous algorithm is trying to take an aggressively large "stepsize". At present, it is however highly unclear whyf is useful at all. In fact, it is not even obvious howf (p) can be evaluated. Nevertheless, we can already show thatf is convex which is necessary for the cutting plane method. Proof. Similar to f , this is immediate from the definition, sincef is the maximum of a family of linear functions in p.
Equivalent form off and the time complexity of computing separation oracle
We give an alternate form off which is nicer to work with algorithmically. The next lemma shows that
for some γ that depends on p (and the tiebreaking rule used by the greedy algorithm). Among other things, this formulation off resembles common regularizers used in optimization better. One can think of it as if p is changed to p + γ · 1 [n] .
Lemma 4.11. Suppose v i (j) are given and stored as n sorted lists sorted in decreasing order
With a running time of n 2 · T V +Õ(n 2 ) 7 , given price p, there is an algorithm, which we call ALLGREEDY, that finds
γ such that for all i, S
Proof. First, we define the algorithm ALLGREEDY. The algorithm starts with a very large value of γ such that D(i, p + γ · 1 [n] ) = {∅} for all agents i. Then we gradually decrease γ keeping at each step a set
) that monotonically grow as γ decreases, in the sense that for γ 1 > γ 2 , S * i (γ 1 ) ⊆ S * i (γ 2 ). We stop the algorithm as i |S * i (γ)| reaches n. The algorithm is best visualized as a continuous process, although it admits a very efficient discrete implementation as we will see in a moment. Before, we note that we can use the Greedy algorithm to compute
) and if we fix the same tie breaking, the order in which we add the elements is the same for every γ, the only thing that changes is the stopping criteria (the larger γ is, the later we stop).
So this procedure can be implemented by running a greedy algorithm in parallel for each agent i. Initially γ is very large and all S * i (γ) = ∅. Then in any given moment, we can compute what is the largest value of γ for which it is possible to add one more item to the demanded set of i. This is simply the largest marginal of an i for the next item: max
We can decrese γ to this value and advance one of the agent's greedy algorithm one step further.
We need to argue that it satisfies the three properties in the lemma and that it can be implemented in n 2 T V + O(n 2 ) time. For the running time, the algorithm can by updating lists L j such that in each iteration, it is a sorted list of v i (S * i ∪ j) − v i (S * i ). Since all sets start as the empty set, this is correct in the beginning of the algorithm. Now, in each iteration, we can scan all the lists to find the next largest marginal, taking O(n) to inspect the top of each list. This gives us the next value of γ and the pair i, j to udpate S * i ← S * i ∪ j. Now, after the update, we go through each list L k updating the value of the marginal of agent i for k, since S * i was updated. This takes O(log(m)) for each list, so in total, this process takes nT V +Õ(n). Since there are at most n iterations, the overall running time is n 2 T V +Õ(n 2 ).
7 Assuming the cost of initializing S * i = ∅ is not needed. This is acceptable here because our algorithm would only use S * i to compute the subgradient which S * i = ∅ has no effect on. Now, for three properties in the lemma, property 2 is true by construction. For properties 1 and 3, consider the following chain of inequalities:
Hence, all inequalities hold with equality, which means in particular thatf
Corollary 4.12. Suppose v i (j) are given and stored as n sorted lists {v i (j)} j each of which has m elements. Then the greedy algorithm computes a subgradient off in n 2 · T V +Õ(n 2 ) time.
Proof. This follows directly from Lemma 4.11 as the gradient of Proof. Let p eq and S = (S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S m ) be an equilibrium price and allocation. Consider the following chain of inequalities:
Where the first inequality follows from the definition off , the second from the fact that p * is a minimizer off , the third follows from the fact thatf ≤ f for all prices p, since f is a maximization over all
andf is a maximization over all subsets whose cardinality is exactly [n]. The last inequality follows from the fact that p eq is an equilibrium. This implies that all inequalities should hold with equality, in particular, sincef (p * ) = i v i (S i ), then it must be that: max
The other direction is similar. We havef (p eq ) = i v i (S i ) = f (p eq ) and for any price p,
which shows that any Walrasian price p eq minimizesf .
Applying cutting plane tof
Now that we have established the convexity off and shown how to compute a separation oracle, we are ready to apply to the cutting plane method. Theorem 4.14. For gross substitutes, we can find an equilibrium price p eq in time
Proof. By Lemma 4.10 and Corollary 4.13, we can find an equilibrium price by minimizing convexf . Here we apply the cutting plane method.
Computing v i (j) and storing them as n sorted lists takes mn · T V + O(mn log m) time. By Corollary 4.12, the separation oracle forf can be implemented in n 2 · T V + O(n 2 log(m)) time. Our desired running time then follows by Theorem 3.4.
Strictly speaking, we should show that an approximate minimizer off can be rounded to an exact minimizer efficiently just as we have done in Theorem 4.9. However, instead of repeating exactly the same rounding argument used there, we ask readers to verify that the same argument used in 4.9 can be replayed here with the following LP:
Another way of doing this is to show that if p is an approximate minimizer off , then p + γ · 1 [n] is an approximate minimizer of f so we can simply invoke the rounding argument used in Theorem 4.9.
Obtaining equilibrium allocation from equilibrium price
So far we showed how a vector p eq can be computed. In this section we discuss how to obtain an allocation. At first glance this seems fairly straightforward as given p eq , we can just solve (via the greedy algorithm) max v i (S) − p eq (S) for each buyer i to obtain the corresponding allocation S * i ∈ arg max v i (S) − p eq (S). Unfortunately in general there can be more than one such S * i . If not chosen carefully, the resultant allocation S = (S 1 , . . . , S m ) might not be valid (that is, some item may not be allocated exactly once).
To convince the reader that this is a non-trivial problem, we show that computing an optimal allocation from Walrasian prices is at least as hard as solving the Matroid Union Problem. In the Matroid Union problem we are given m matroids defined over the same ground set M i = ([n], B i ) and a promise that there exist basis B i ∈ B i such that [n] = ∪ i B i , find those basis. Now, consider the following mapping to the problem of computing an optimal allocation: consider m agents with valuations over a set [n] of items such that v i = r M i , i.e. the rank of matroid M i (matroid rank functions are known to be gross substitute valuations [PL] ). The price vector 1 is clearly a vector of Walrasian prices. Finding the optimal allocation, however, involves finding S = (S 1 , . . . , S m ) maximizing i r M i (S i ).
The previous paragraph hopefully convinced the reader that coordinating a market with just a vector of Walrasian prices is not always a simple task. We propose two algorithms for the task: one is based on a modification of standard matroid union algorithms and the other one is a way to extract the optimal allocation from the execution of the cutting plane algorithm. We briefly mention the first one and focus on the second, since it reveals an important structural property of gross substitute valuations that might be of independent interest.
The matroid union based algorithm is inspired by an observation by Gul and Stachetti [GS99] that the set of demanded sets of size k, given by D k (i, p) = {S ∈ D(i, p); |S| = k} form the set of basis of a matroid. The algorithm keeps a variable k i for each agent initialized at the smallest k i for which D k i (i, p) = {∅}. We solve the matroid union for matroids {D k i (i, p)} i=1..m . While i k i < n, we choose an agent to increase his value of k i and update the solution of the matroid union problem (which can be done by a BFS computation in a suitable graph). We omit the details, but the reader familiar with algorithms for matroid union should be able to complete this proof.
We want to focus on a second method for computing the optimal allocation. The second method is based on a new result on the structure of equilibrium prices when the equilibrium allocation is unique. Incidentally, this also answers an open question of Hsu et al [HMR + 15]. To apply this result, we perturb each valuation function with some small noise so that the welfare-maximizing allocation is unique (with high probability).
Both of our methods draw on powerful tools from matroid theory and/or gross substitutes. Nevertheless, we will always try to spell out any results used and make our arguments as self-contained as possible. A working knowledge of matroids and GS would be helpful but not necessary. Notice that by the Second Welfare Theorem (Lemma 2.3), if the optimal allocation is not unique, then no vector of Walrasian prices is robust, since each vector of Walrasian prices support all the allocations. If the optimal allocation is unique, on the other hand, then we show that a vector of robust Walrasian prices always exists. Moreover, the set of Walrasian prices form a full-dimensional convex set in which all interior points are robust.
Robust Walrasian Prices and Market Coordination
Theorem 4.16. If there is an unique partition
S = (S 1 , . . . , S m ) maximizing i v i (S i ), then there exist a vector p such for all p ′ ∈ j [p j − 1 2n , p j + 1 2n ] are Walrasian.
In particular, the set of Walrasian prices is a full-dimensional convex set and all price vectors in its interior are robust Walrasian prices.
The proof involves the concept of the exchange graph, which was first introduced by Murota in [Mur96c] and it characterizes the set of all Walrasian prices as the dual variables of the shortest path polytope for a certain graph. Given an optimal allocation S = (S 1 , . . . , S m ), the Second Welfare Theorem (Lemma 2.3) combined with the characterization of gross substitute functions from Discrete Convex Analysis (Definition 4.3) tells us that the set of Walrasian prices can be characterized by:
Which is clearly a convex set defined by O( i |S i | n) = O(n 2 ) inequalities. A nice combinatorial interpretation of this polytope is that it corresponds to the set of potentials in a graph.
To make the construction nicer, augment the items with m dummy items, one for each buyer. The set of items becomes [n] ∪ [m], and the valuations are extended to the subsets of [n] ∪ [m] in a way that agents completely ignore the dummy items, i.e., for
). Also, augment S i to contain the dummy item for buyer i. Under this transformation we can simplify the definition of P to:
∈ S i since we can represent adding and removing an item as a swap with a dummy item. Under this transformation, construct a directed graph with one node for each item in [n]. For each i ∈ [m], j ∈ S i and k / ∈ S i , add an edge (j, k) with weight
Since the allocation S = (S 1 , . . . , S m ) is optimal, there exists at least one vector of Walrasian prices p ∈ P . This guarantees that the graph exchange graph has no negative cycles, since for any cycle C = {(j 1 , j 2 ), . . . , (j t , j 1 )}, we can bound the sum of weights by r w jr,j r+1 ≥ r p jr − p j r+1 = 0, where he inequality follows from the definition of P and the definition of the weights. Now we argue that the exchange graph can't contain any cycles of zero weight: Lemma 4.17. If S is the unique optimal allocation, then the exchange graph has no cycles of zero weight.
Proof. If there were cycles of zero weight, let C be the cycle of zero weight of minimum length. Now, let C i = {(j 1 , t 1 ), . . . , (j a , t a )} be the edges (j, t) in C with j ∈ S i and (consequently) t / ∈ S i . Now, define S ′ i = S i ∪ {t 1 , . . . , t a } − {j 1 , . . . , j a }. Notice that we perfoemed the swaps prescribed by the cycle, so each item that moved was removed from one set and added to another and as a result, S ′ = (S ′ 1 , . . . , S ′ m ) is still a partition of the items. Using Lemmas 4.6 and 4.5 we get that:
and therefore S ′ = (S ′ 1 , . . . , S ′ m ) is an alternative optimal allocation, contradicting the uniqueness of S.
Now we are ready to prove the Theorem 4.16:
Proof of Theorem 4.16. Now, since we know there are no zero weight cycles and all the edge weights are integral, perform the following operation: for each vertex j ∈ [n] in the directed graph, split it into j 1 and j 2 with an edge between j 1 and j 2 with weight − 1 n . Make all incoming edges to i be incoming to j 1 and all outgoing edges from j to be outgoing from j 2 . The resulting graph has again no cycles of negative weight, since the new edges can decrease each cycle by at most 1.
Therefore, it is possible to find a potential in this graph. A potential of a weighted graph with edge weights w jt is a function φ from the nodes to R such that φ(t) ≤ φ(j) + w jt . It can be easily computed by running a shortest path algorithm from any fixed node source node and taking the distance from source node to j as φ(j). For the particular case of the graph constructed, it is useful to take the source as one of the dummy nodes.
After a potential is computed from the distance from a dummy node to each node, define the price of j as p j = φ(j 2 ). By the definiton of the potential for each edge (j, t) in the graph:
This means in particular that all inequalities that define P are valid with a slack of 1 n . Therefore, changing any price by at most 1 2n still results in a valid Walrasian equilibrium. This completes the proof of the first part of the theorem.
Since P contains a cube, then it must be a full-dimensional convex body. Finally, let's show that every price vector in the interior of P is a vector of robust Walrasian prices. By the second welfare theorem (Lemma 2.3), S i ∈ D(i, p) for all p ∈ P . Now, assume that for some point in the interior, there is
If so, if we decrease the price of j by ǫ, S ′ i becomes strictly better than S i , i.e. S i / ∈ D(i, p − ǫ1 j ), which contradicts the second welfare theorem since p − ǫ1 j ∈ P . (ii) there is j ∈ S i − S ′ i . If so, if we increase the price of j by ǫ, S ′ i becomes strictly better than
, which again contradicts the second welfare theorem since p + ǫ1 j ∈ P .
Finding optimal allocation using cutting planes
Forcing optimal allocation to be unique We use the isolation lemma, a standard technique to guarantee a unique optimum for combinatorial problems: the isolation lemma. over the partition (S 1 , . . . , S m ). To achieve this, we first replace v j byṽ j (S) = Bv j (S) + w j (S) where B is some big number to be determined and w j (i) is set as in the isolation lemma (with N to be determined as well). Note that though we have mn w ij 's whereas there are only n w i 's in the isolation lemma. Proof. Let (S ′ 1 , . . . , S ′ m ) be an optimal solution w.r.t the original problem. We first show that any suboptimal partition (S 1 , . . . , S m ) cannot be optimal for the perturbed problem. Since v i assume integer values, we have
which shows that a suboptimal solution to the original problem cannot be optimal for the perturbed one. For
The first part B m j=1 v j (S ′ j ) is equal for all optimal solutions (to original). We can then apply isolation lemma to the second part. The probability that we have a unique optimum to the perturbed problem is 1 − mn/N = 1 − 1/n O(1) , as desired.
Finding equilibrium allocation via cutting plane
By Lemma 4.19, we may assume wlog that there is an optimal allocation, or equilibrium allocation (since they are identical by the welfare theorem). We would make this assumption throughout the remainder of this section. Moreover, to avoid inconsistency, we would keep the same notation v i even though they are really perturbedṽ j . Because of this change, the function value |v i (S)| is now bounded by
Assuming the optimal allocation is unique, this amounts to a direct application of the cutting plane method thanks to Theorem 4.16.
Lemma 4.20. Assume that the equilibrium allocation is unique. For gross substitutes, we can find either this equilibrium allocation or an interior equilibrium price in time
Proof. Let K be the set of Walrasian prices, and int(K) be the interior of K. By Theorem 4.16, int(K) is a convex subset of width at least 1/n. Our goal is to find some p ∈ int(K) or the equilibrium allocation. Now we apply cutting plane to find some point in int(K). This is known as the separation problem whose goal is to find some point p ∈ int(K) or to certify that int(K) is empty using a separation oracle. The version of cutting plane we would use is the main result (Theorem 31) of [LSW15] . This cutting plane method guarantees that, using [−R, R] n as the initial feasible region, either we find p ∈ int(K) or int(K) has width at most O(nǫ log(R/ǫ)) in time
where SO is the time spent by the separation oracle. We would discuss how to choose ǫ and R at the end; for now we briefly describe the cutting plane method. In our case, int(K) is nonempty. For the separation oracle we can simply use the subgradient oracle for f because int(K) are minimizers off (Corollary 4.13). As long as the subgradient oracle returns a nonzero subgradient, the separating hyperplane is nondegenerate and cutting plane would proceed normally until it finds a point p ∈ int(K).
So there are two cases. If a subgradient is 0, by Corollary 4.12 this subgradient already tells a Walrasian allocation. Otherwise, the cutting plane method would stop when it finds p ∈ int(K).
As int(K) has width at least 1/n, setting ǫ = O(1/n 2 R) would do. By their cutting plane method, it has found some p ∈ int(K) and terminated.
As for R, recall that there must be a Walrasian price in [−2M, 2M ] n . However, now the box should be
n as our v i has been pertubed (see beginning of the section). Therefore we take R = O(mn O(1) M ). The running time of cutting plane is then O(n log(nmM ) · SO + n 3 log O(1) (nmM )).
Finally, the overall running time simply follows from Corollary 4.12 as the separation oracle can be implemented in SO = n 2 · T V time with a preprocessing cost of mn · T V + O(mn log m) (for sorting v i (j)).
We are almost done as a simple trick would allow us to recover an equilibrium allocation from an interior Walrasian price. Proof. If (S * 1 , . . . , S * m ) is a valid allocation (i.e. partition) then we are done. Otherwise since j |S * j | = n, some item k ∈ [n] appears in no S * j . Consider p and p ′ = p + δ · 1 k for some sufficiently small δ > 0. Both of them are Walrasian prices because p is in the interior. By Corollary 4.13, they minimizef .
Recall that (S * 1 , . . . , S * m ) maximizes
Imagine prices change from p to p ′ . Now that item k becomes more expensive and the other items stay the same in price, the maximizer of
which contradicts the fact that they both minimizef .
Putting everything together, we can find equilibrium allocation via the cutting plane method as well.
Theorem 4.22. For gross substitutes, we can find either an equilibrium allocation in time
Proof. Follows from Lemmas 4.19, 4.20 and 4.21.
Combinatorial approach to Walrasian Equilibrium for Gross Substitutes
In a sequence of two foundational papers [Mur96b, Mur96c] , Murota shows that the assigment problem for valuated matroids, a class of functions introduced by Dress and Wenzel [DW90] can be solved in strongly polynomial time. We show how this algorithm can be used to obtain anÕ(nm + n 3 ) strongly polynomial time algorithm for problem of computing a Walrasian equilibrium for gross substitute valuations. Our contribution is two-fold: first we map the Walrasian equilibrium problem on gross substitute valuations to the assignment problem on valuated matroids. The straightforward mapping allows us to obtain a strongly polynomial time algorithm with running time O(mn 3 log(m + n)). Inspired by our O(mn + n 3 ) algorithm, we revisit Murota's algorithm and propose two optimizations that bring the running time down to O((mn + n 3 ) log(m + n)). Murota's algorithm works by computing augmenting paths in a structure known as the exchange graph. First we show that for the Walrasian equilibrium problem, this graph admits a more succint representation. The we propose a data structure to amortize the cost of some operations across all iterations. In section 5.1 we define valuated matroids and the assignment problem for valuated matroids. Then we describe Murota's algorithm for this problem. We also discuss the relation between the assignment problem for valuated matroids and the welfare problem for gross substitutes. The goal of subsection 5.1 is to provide the reader with the historical context for this result.
The reader insterested solely in the welfare problem is welcome to skip to Section 5.2 which can be read independently, without any mention to valuated matroids or the assignment problem. A complete proof is given in that section.
The assignment problem for valuated matroids
A valuated matroid is an assignment of weights to basis of a matroid respecting some valuated analogue of the exchange property. 
Valuated matroids are related to gross substitutes by the following one-to-one correspondence. We refer the reader to Lemma 7.4 in [PL] for a proof. 
) is a valuated matroid defined over the basis of the n-uniform matroid on 2n elements. Now, we are ready to define the assignment problem for valuated matroids: Definition 5.3 (Valuated matroid assignment problem). Given two sets V 1 , V 2 , matroids M 1 = (V 1 , B 1 ) and M 2 = (V 2 , B 2 ) of the same rank, valuated matroids ω 1 : B 1 → R and ω 2 : B 2 → R and a weighted bipartite graph G = (V 1 ∪ V 2 , E, w), find a matching M from V 1 to V 2 maximizing:
where M is a subset of edges of E forming a matching and M 1 and M 2 are the sets of endpoints of M in V 1 and V 2 respectively.
Murota gives two strongly-polynomial time algorithms based on network flows for the problem above in [Mur96c] -the first based on cycle-cancellations and the second based on flow-augmentations. Although the running time is not formally analyzed in his paper, it is possible to see that his algorithm (more specifically the algorithm Augmenting algorithm with potentials in Section 3 of [Mur96c] ) has running timẽ
First, we show a simple reduction from the welfare problem for gross substitutes to this problem. Given m gross substitute valuation functions v i : 2 [n] → R, define the following instance of the valuated matroid assignment problem: define the first matroid as [mn] n i.e. the n-uniform matroid on mn elements. Interpret the elements of [nm] as "the allocation of item j to agent i" for each pair (i, j). Following this interpretation, each S ⊆ [nm] can be seen as S = ∪ m i=1 S i where S i are the elements assigned to agent i. This allows us to define for each S ∈
) and ω 2 (S) = 0 for all S. Finally, define the edges of E such that for each j ∈ [n], the j-th element of [n] are connected to the element (i, j) in [mn] for each i.
One needs to prove that ω 1 satisfies the properties defining a valuated matroid, but this can be done using the transformations described in [PL] . We omit this proof since we are giving a self-contained description of the algorithm in the next section.
In the construction shown below, |V 1 | = |E| = nm, |V 2 | = n and rank(M 1 ) = rank(M 2 ) = n. This leads to anÕ(m · n 3 ) strongly polynomial time algorithm for the welfare problem.
Gross substitutes welfare problem inÕ(nm + n
3 ) time
In this section we give a self-contained description of a specialized version of Murota's algorithm for the gross substitutes welfare problem and show that the running time ofÕ(m · n 3 ) can be improved tõ O(nm + n 3 ). Murota's algorithm for the case of generic valuated matroids can be quite complicated. Since the underlying matroids are simple (uniform matroids) and the functions being optimized have additional structure, it is possible to come up with a simpler algorithm. Our presentation also makes the algorithms accessible to the reader not familiar with discrete convex analysis and the theory of valuated matroids. We consider the setting in which a set [n] of items needs to be allocated to m agents with monotone valuation functions v i : 2 [n] → R satisfying the gross substitutes condition. Consider the intermediary problem of computing the optimal allocation for the first k items (in some arbitrary order): max
The central idea of the algorithm is to successively solve I 1 , I 2 , . . . , I n using the solution of I k to compute I k+1 . We will show how a solution to (I k+1 ) can be computed from a solution of (I k ) via a shortest path computation in a graph withÕ(m + n 2 ) edges. A solution for problem (I k ) consists on an allocation S = (S 1 , . . . , S m ) of items in [k] to agents 1, . . . , m and a price vector p 1 , . . . , p k that certifies that the allocation is optimal. Since optimality for gross substitutes can be certified by checking that no agent wants to add an item, remove an item or swap an item (Defintion 4.3) then S, p need to satisfy the following conditions for every agent i and every j / ∈ S i and j ′ ∈ S i :
Exchange graph
The first step to solve (I k ) is to build a combinatorial object called the exchange graph using the solution of (I k−1 ), expressed as a pair S, p. We define a weighted directed graph on V = [k] ∪ {φ 1 , . . . , φ m }. Intuitively, we can think of φ i as an "empty spot" in the allocation of agent i. We add edges as follows:
• (t, j) for all items t and j not acquired by the same agent under S. If i is the agent holding item t, then the edge represents the change in utility (under price p) for agent i to swap his item t by j: w t,j = v i (S i ) − v i (S i ∪ j − t) + p j − p t
• (φ i , j) for all items j / ∈ S i . It represents the change in utility for i to add item j:
Notice that problem (I k−1 ) only defines prices for 1, . . . , k − 1. So for the construction above to be well defined we need to define p k . We will set p k in a moment, but before that, note that for all the edges not involving k, w ≥ 0 which follow by the fact that p is a certificate of optimality for S and therefore conditions ADD and SWAP hold. Finally, notice that there are only directed edges from k to other nodes, so p k always appear with positive sign in w. So, we can set p k large enough such that all egdes have non-negative weights, in particular, set:
Updating prices and allocations via shortest path
After the exchange graph is built, the algorithm is trivial: compute the minimal-length shortest path from some φ i (i.e. among all paths of minimum weight between φ i and k, pick the one with minimum length).
Since the edges are non-negative, the shortest path can be computed in the order of the number of edges using Dijkstra's algorithm in O(|E| · log |E|) where |E| is the number of edges in the graph. Dijkstra's algorithm can be easily modified to compute the minimum weight path with shortest length using the following idea: if weights are integers, then substitute weights w ij by w ij − ǫ. In the end, round the solution up. Or more formally, run Dijkstra in the ordered ring (Z 2 , +, <) with weights (w ij , 1) where + is the componentwise sum and < is the lexicographic order. Let P be the path output by Dijkstra. Update the allocation by performing the swaps prescribed by P . In other words, if edge (t, j) ∈ P and t ∈ S i , then we swap t by j in S i . Also, if edge (φ i , j) ∈ P we add j in S i . Formally, let (t r , j r ) r=1..a be all the edges in P with t r ∈ S i or t r = φ i . Then we update S i to S i ∪ {j 1 , . . . , j a } − {t 1 , . . . , t a }.
The execution of Dijkstra also produces a certificate of optimality of the shortest path in the form of the minimum distance from some φ i to any given node. So, there is a distance function d such that
Moreover, for all edges (t, j) and (φ i , j) in the shortest path P , this holds with equality, i.e.: d(j) = d(φ i ) + w φ i ,j and d(j) = w jt + d(t). Update the price of each item j from p j to p j − d(j).
Running time analysis
Before we show that each iteration produces an optimal pair of allocation S and prices p for problem (I k ) we analyze the running time.
The exchange graph for problem (I k ) as previously described has O(mk+k 2 ) edges. Running Dijkstra's algorithm on this graph has running timeÕ(mk + k 2 ) for (I k ), which corresponds toÕ(mn 2 + n 3 ) time overall.
In order to get the overall running time down toÕ(mn + n 3 ) we need one extra observation. Since we want to compute the shortest path from any of the φ i nodes to k, we can collapse all φ i nodes to a single node φ. Now, for any given node j: w φ,j = min
Now, the graph is reduced to O(k 2 ) edges for problem (I k ). So, Dijkstra can be computed inÕ(k 2 ). We are only left with the task to compute w φ,j . Our task is to compute min i [v i (S i ) − v i (S i ∪ j)]. This can be divided in two parts:
1. active agents: the minimum among the agents i for which S i = ∅. There are at most k of those, so we can iterate over all of them and compute the minimum explicitly;
2. inactive agents: the minimum over all agents with S i = ∅. In order to do so we maintain the following data structure: in the first iteration, i.e. in (I 1 ), we compute v i ({j}) for every i, j (which takes O(mn) time) and keep for each item j a sorted list L j in decreasing order of v i (j) for all i.
In the end of each iteration, whenever an innactive agent i becomes active (i.e. we allocate him an item), we remove them from L j for all j. This operation takes O(n) time to go over all lists. Now, once we have this structure, we can simply compute the minimum among the innactive buyers min i [v i (S i ) − v i (S i ∪ j)] = − max i v i ({j}) we simply look the minimum element of the list L j . Therefore, even though we need to pay O(mn) time in (I 1 ). In each subsequent iteration we pay only O(n) to update lists L j and then we can make query the value of w φ,j in constant time.
This leads to a running time of O(mn) in (I 1 ) andÕ(n + k 2 ) in each subsequent iteration, leading to an overall running time ofÕ(mn + n 3 ). We also note that for each edge we build of the graph, we query the value oracle once. So the oracle complexity is O(nm + n 3 ) value oracle calls.
Correctness
We are left to argue that the solution (S, p) produced by the algorithm is indeed a valid solution for problem (I k ). This can be done by checking that the price vector p obtained certifies the optimality of S. The main ingredients for the proof are Lemmas 4.5 and 4.6. We encourage the reader the revisit the statement of those lemmas before reading the proof of the following theorem.
∪ {j 1 , . . . , j a } − {t 1 , . . . , t a }. Using Lemma 4.6, we note that (t 1 , r 1 ), . . . , (t a , r a ) is an unique minimum matching in the sense of Lemma 4.5. Therefore:
) on both sides, we get:
tr,jr = 0 Therefore:
Descending Auction View
One can reinterpret the procedure above as a descending auction. Initially all items very large price (say like the price set for p k in the beginning of phase k). Each shortest path computation produces a distance function d that dictates how each price should decrease. Indeed, they monotonically decrease until we reach a Walrasian equilibrium.
We note that it is important in this algorithm that we compute in each step both a primal and a dual solution. Without the dual solution (the price vector), it is still possible to carry out the shortest path computation, but since the edges in the path can have mixed signs, Dijkstra's algorithm is no longer available and one needs to pay an extra factor of n to run Bellman-Ford's algorithm.
